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Abstract
Conventional approaches to the modeling of autonomous agents and agent communication rely
heavily on the ascription of mental properties like beliefs and intentions to the individual agents.
These “mentalistic” approaches are, when applicable, very powerful, but become problematic in
open environments like the Semantic Web, Peer2Peer systems and open multiagent systems popu-
lated by truly autonomous, self-interested grey- or black-box agents with limited trustability.
In this work, we propose communication attitudes in form of dynamic, revisable ostensible beliefs
(or opinions) and ostensible intentions as foundational means for the logical, external description
of agents obtained from the observation of communication processes, in order to retain the advan-
tages of mentalistic agent models as far as possible, but with veriﬁable results without the need
to speculate about covert agent internals. As potential applications, communication attitudes al-
low for a simultaneous reasoning about the (possibly inconsistent) ”public image(-s)” of a certain
agent and her mental properties without blurring interferences, new approaches to communication
language semantics, and a ﬁne-grained, statement-level concept of trustability.
As a further application of communicative attitudes, we introduce multi-source opinions and opinion
bases. These allow for the computational representation of semantically heterogeneous knowledge,
including the representation of inconsistent knowledge in a socially reiﬁed form, and a probabilis-
tic weighting of possibly indeﬁnite and inconsistent assertions explicitly attributed to diﬀerent
provenances and social contexts.
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1 Introduction
Although it is nowadays widely accepted in artiﬁcial intelligence that open
systems with heterogeneous, more or less inscrutable actors (like the Semantic
Web or Peer2Peer systems) are an increasingly important ﬁeld of application
for multi-agency, agents (including human users) are still mainly characterized
in terms of their mental attitudes. For the most part, however, these are
concealed from the point of view of an external observer. And even if the
mental states of all participants were accessible, it would be an extremely
diﬃcult task to describe the dynamic behavior of a system as a function of all
of its individuals, particularly in applications with a large number of actors
(like it is possibly the case in internet-based applications). Hence, although
the description of an agent in terms of her beliefs, intentions and desires can
be unsurpassably powerful, it comes to its limits in such scenarios.
One way to cope with this situation in order to ensure the controllability
of the agents and to secure the attainment of supra-individual system goals
is to impose normative restrictions on agent behavior, and/or to model the
system in terms of static organizational structures. While such approaches
certainly have their merits, and systems without any predeﬁned policies and
protocols are hardly imaginable, they can also lead to serious limitations of
the desired properties of autonomous systems like their robustness and ﬂex-
ibility by imposing constraints on agent adaptivity in a top-down fashion. 4
And after all, agent technology is basically a bottom-up approach, allowing
for the emergence of behavior and solutions, and should not be turned upside
down. This is not to dismiss the importance of supra-individual structures
and norms, of course. Especially public communication models like an agent
communication language semantics cannot avoid normativity completely. But
we think that normativeness should be limited to a minimum, and the focal
point should be the emergence and adaptivity of the models, and the mea-
surement and autonomy-respecting inﬂuencing of the degree of adherence of
the agents to given models at run-time.
Another possible approach, which could be seen as complementary to the
ones just described, would be to constrain the modeling of black-box agents
from an external point of view by limiting the validity of norms or cognitive
models (thus inducing some sort of bounded observer rationality), e.g. by
using information about the respective agent’s trustability and reputation.
The approach introduced in this paper is basically compatible and in line with
4 Even the enactment of an obligatory agent communication language semantics can seri-
ously limit agent autonomy, for example by prescribing to some degree what the communi-
cation parties have to “think” during communication (like [5]).
M. Nickles et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 157 (2006) 95–11596
such means, but takes a diﬀerent perspective: Instead of adding restrictions
to statements about internal agent properties, or to social commitments [20]
or other norms, we “lift” mental attitudes to the social stage by introducing
logical and veriﬁable communication-level pendants to belief and intention,
namely the communication attitudes opinion (synonymous to ostensible belief
in this work) 5 and ostensible intention.
This “second set” of attitudes will be given a meaning which resembles the
modalities of agent belief and intention in many ways, and can be used as a
direct replacement for belief and intention in most imaginable scenarios (as we
will later show for FIPA ACL semantics). It is nevertheless obtained and re-
lated entirely from/to observations, and cleanly separated from actual mental
attitudes. The diﬀerence of actual and alleged mental attitudes has sometimes
been recognized informally in ﬁelds like belief ascription, but not been handled
explicitly or in a formal framework so far, to our best knowledge. Communi-
cation attitudes also provide a logical model which is descriptive in the sense
that it describes the actual communicated ”public image” of an agent 6 , in
contrast to (and as a possible complement of) prescriptive approaches based
on social norms and commitments.
With our approach, we aim thus at a convenient and practicable means to
reason about interaction and communication processes. Thereby we want to
prevent the diﬃculties and confusion that come along with traditional men-
tal reasoning about truly autonomous agents (but without loosing the great
expressiveness of agent modeling in terms of mental properties as far as possi-
ble), and we also aim at avoiding the rather normative or indiﬀerent (in regard
to what ”being committed” actually means) perspective of most commitment-
based approaches (but acknowledge the necessity to provide a minimally com-
mitting communication act meaning as a matter of principle).
Our approach to abstract from traditional ”in depth” mental modeling
and reasoning promises a great deal of complexity reduction, especially when
large sets of mentally opaque agents have to be handled. It also allows for the
simultaneous reasoning about real beliefs and intentions of an agent on the
one hand and his communicated viewpoints (ostensible beliefs and intentions)
on the other without confusion, and for the modeling of social behavior which
cannot be modeled as a revision of beliefs and intentions, like the bargaining
5 We could likewise talk about “assertions”. We prefer the term opinion, however, since
it allows us to speak about passive opinions as well (details on this will follow below), and
avoids the fact of “something being asserted” to be mixed up with the speech act type of
the same name.
6 Whereby the term ”public” should not disavow that a certain ”image” of an agent could
be known and intended only to/for a restricted group of agents, or be restricted otherwise
to some social context.
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of opinions.
Optionally, communicative attitudes can be annotated with spheres of re-
liability on statement basis, in order to restrict their validity. Obviously,
communication attitudes are highly context dependant, and when the social
context changes (like when the agent faces a diﬀerent communication partner),
its communication attitudes might also change, possibly leading to inconsis-
tent ostensible beliefs and intentions of the same agent. In this regard, we
believe that existing approaches to trust and reputation could be integrated
with our approach in a straightforward manner. Assuming signiﬁcant spheres
of reliability as a heuristics makes use of a remarkable property of commu-
nication: even if an agent cannot be trusted, she will quite likely stick to
her behavior and opinions exhibited before as long as she is under continuous
observation.
As an important ﬁeld of application besides agent communication seman-
tics we consider ontology and knowledge acquisition and integration in open
environments like the Semantic Web. Similar to the attempts to determine
agents’ beliefs, traditional knowledge acquisition and multi-agent belief revi-
sion and fusion (see, e.g., [4]) aim for determining the “truth” from the contri-
butions of multiple sources. But settling on the opinion level, the main focus of
such approaches could shift to the determination, weighting and integration of
multiple individual viewpoints and “subjective truths”, traditional attempts
to judge the reliability of these individual contributions taking a subordinate
position. To this end, we propose opinion bases as some sort of “multiagent
belief bases” lifted to the level of communication attitudes. These are based
on previous approaches to extend repositories of (RDF) statements with (i)
the provenance of the respective knowledge provider, and (ii) a probabilistic
weight denoting the degree of social acceptance of the respective statement
(see, e.g., [17]), and on the concepts of Open Knowledge Bases and Open
Ontologies [6]. To our best knowledge, this resembles the ﬁrst agent-based
approach to (formal) multi-source knowledge 7 which allows for the extension
of knowledge contributions with probabilistic degrees of behavioral agreement
(or disagreement, respectively) given to them by explicitly listed individuals
or social groups with consideration and integration of communicative (i.e.,
social) contexts.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The next section introduces
opinions and ostensible intentions as communication attitudes, contrasting
intra-agent beliefs and intentions. Section 3 presents a logic for the represen-
tation of opinions and ostensible intentions as logical modalities, and suggests
7 “Knowledge” in a weak sense, conceding that in open systems competing subjective
“truths” might exist, which should nevertheless be distinguished from agent-internal beliefs.
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how the FIPA-ACL semantics could be “lifted” to the social level. As a further
example application, section 4 shows how semantically heterogeneous sets of
agent assertions can be fused, stored and rated within so-called opinion bases.
Section 5 concludes with a summary and an outlook to open research issues.
2 Communication Attitudes
The main diﬀerence between an agent’s belief and an opinion (ostensible be-
lief) of her is that the former is a mental attitude, whereas the latter is a
communication attitude which is triggered and revised by communicative acts
and existing social structures (like norms), i.e. by social conditions. The opin-
ion of an autonomous grey- or black-box agent neither has to reﬂect this
agent’s belief, nor does uttering an opinion necessarily mean that the agent
truthfully intends to make someone belief it.
Opinions emerge from more or less hidden agent intentions and social pro-
cesses, and they are tailored to the intended communicative eﬀect and the
opinions and ostensible intentions of the audience. Thus, opinions are not
necessarily governed by the principles of, e.g., perception, epistemic logic,
knowledge acquisition, and belief revision, which are instead devoted to the
acquisition and maintenance of truthful and consistent information. They are,
however, to a certain extent determined by social conditions, including legal,
organizational and economic laws. Hence, although opinions might as well
reﬂect the true beliefs of benevolent, trustworthy agents (as assumed in most
traditional approaches to agent communication semantics), this should rather
be considered a special case in open systems.
From an observer’s point of view, a pro-active opinion can be character-
ized as a communication attitude of an agent within a particular course of
communication, denoting that the agent allegedly intends to make the ad-
dressed agents act in conformance with the expressed information. We can
thus reduce pro-active opinions to ostensible intentions.
Informally, this ostensibly intended “acting in conformance with the opin-
ion” means to act to a certain degree as if the propositional content of the
uttered opinion was true. This includes (i) the adoption of the opinion as
an opinion (thus, uttering an opinion means to ostensibly bring about an
opinion recursively), and (ii) probably an appropriate “physical” (i.e., non-
communicative) behavior. If, for example, someone asserts that the addressee
will, should or has to do something, a way for the addressee to act in confor-
mance with this opinion is to share it, and thus to actually perform the action
she is said to be obliged or even willing to do. Following the utterance “You
are obliged to close the window”, it is not suﬃcient to just reply with “Yes I
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am”. The only way for the addressee to act in conformance with the former
opinion is to actually close the window (presumed that there exists an implicit
time limit for obeying the order). Doing so implicitly includes expression of
the (conforming) opinion “I obey”. In general, it is often possible to translate





′ agent2 has reasons to perform action
′)′′.
Pursuing an option can have the goal of actually convincing the addressee
to believe the expressed information, but since in our scenario the ostensi-
ble are autonomous agents, the success of an opinion can only be observed
indirectly and temporarily as a change of opinion of another agent. Thus,
the meaning of opinions is inherently recursive: An opinion is maintained in
order to change an opinion, or to express approval with another opinion. This
reﬂects the insight that the structures of communication among black-box ac-
tors can not deﬁnitely be grounded in determinable causes (like agent beliefs),
but only in form of more or less (un-)reliable expectations [16] about the fu-
ture interaction behavior of the communicating agents, until, eventually, the
opinion results in non-symbolic acting (like “closing the window” in the above
example).
In analogy to ostensible beliefs an ostensible intention is a communication
attitude denoting that the intention holder allegedly commits herself to striv-
ing for some desired action or goal state. This may include getting another
agent to perform a desired action (i.e., in our framework the ostensible in-
tention of agent1 to have action a performed does not necessarily imply that
agent1 can perform a by herself in our framework). Just like opinions, osten-
sible intentions are part of the “public (or discourse) identities” of otherwise
opaque agents, and they are thus in general not identical with any “true”
intentions in the sense of earnest self-commitments [19].
In practice, the main diﬀerence between an intention and an ostensible
intention is that the latter implies some extrovert performance towards the
ostensibly desired action or state (the agent plays act, so to say). Such a
performance may be limited to a very short period of time (e.g., think of
provocations and joke questions), and the eﬀort an agent puts into the real-
ization of an ostensible intention might also be deliberatively limited, namely
if the agents does not sincerely mean to do so. But it might likewise be possi-
ble that an ostensible opinion or belief is much more stable than any mental
attitude of the same agent. For example, the communicative act request de-
notes the ostensible intention of the uttering agent to make the addressee fulﬁl
the request, and an observer can rather safely conclude from the observation
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of the request that the agent will in some way strive for the fulﬁlment of the
request as long she is in social contact with the addressee (e.g., in terms of
mutual observation).
It should be noted in this regard that the addressed agents might be-
lieve that a particular ostensible intention is not an “honest” intention, and
the uttering agent might again know about this, without necessarily making
communication dysfunctional. In fact, ostensibility does not necessarily im-
ply deception, but only denotes that a communication attitude is bounded in
terms of validity and eﬀort-making from the more or less uninformed point
of view of an observer. To some extent, this reﬂects the conception of in-
tentional stances [3]. An ostensible intention or belief can be known for sure
to be feigned but still be useful, be it just for the reason that even such an
attitude is likely to determine the acting of the agent who claims it for social
reasons, as long this agent is under observation.
Although every ostensible attitude maps to mental attitudes (which, re-
garding their desired eﬀects, might be contrary to the ostensible attitudes),
human communication to a certain extent works without the need to rea-
son about these “background intentions”, if only to reduce the complexity
of cognitive reasoning while communicating [14]. This makes communication
processes the constituents of systems which are to some degree independent
from their participants’ mental states (the so-called autopoiesis of communica-
tion), and it makes communication attitudes largely (but not fully, of course)
determined by social (i.e., communicative) events.
A makeshift, which is quite often used at least informally, would be to
“misuse” mental attitudes in combination with additional assumptions like the
trustability of “whole agents” to model agent interaction instead. A related,
but more appropriate approach would be to ascribe “weak” intentions to an
observed agent that are not necessarily pursued until the intended eﬀect is
eventually achieved or impossible [2]. This approach would assumably be
workable, but it would again yield the problem of mixing the levels of cognition
and sociality, and force the socially reasoning communication observer to ﬁnd
an immediate, possibly complicated mapping of alleged attitudes to intentions.
If someone asserts “x = y”, it is certainly a good idea to reason about this
assertion “as is” as long as possible instead of trying to boil it down to some
set of weak intentions immediately. Nevertheless, in order to give a proper
semantics for communication attitudes, we would need to provide a mapping
from assertions to behavioral expectations, as outlined later in this paper. We
think that the amalgamation of pseudo mental and pseudo communication
attitudes, which is still quite common, is dangerous and inappropriate. It is
likely to impede the simultaneous reasoning about mental and social issues,
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and it is misleading with respect to the very speciﬁc nature of communication
processes, which form a system of their own that is in a certain sense decoupled
from mental cognition [14]. To this end, ostensible beliefs and intentions shall
provide a second set of attitudes cleanly separated from mental attitudes,
but still resembling properties and features of “real” mental attitudes. This
does not mean to ground ACL semantics in conventions [12] only. We do
not require communication acts to be sincere (or their content being reliable),
but we assume that rational communicating agents act in conformance with
their ostensible intentions and beliefs as they show up to an observer in their
assertions (requests, commands...) at least to a limited amount, shifting the
focus of communication semantics from a priori to a posteriori modeling.
Opinions and ostensible intentions are thus ostensible in the sense of being not
necessarily undesigning, opinions are at the same time subjective statements in
the sense that they (their content, respectively) are not necessarily believed to
be true by the observer. In addition, both attitudes are assumed to be rational
in the sense that their claim or alleged intention is pursued by the utterer in
some foreseeable, but probably limited manner, given their content and social
context, i.e., each opinion and ostensible intention can be annotated with its
own degree (sphere) of reliability. This view is heavily inﬂuenced by the more
radical approach suggested in [15], but focusses on the logical modeling of
communication states instead of the determination of these states.
Social and institutional commitments [20] are another, more recent and -
in our opinion - more adequate approach to the modeling of agent commu-
nication (as compared to traditional mentalist approaches). But we also feel
that in some scenarios this so-called social semantics does not provide a suf-
ﬁciently rich and powerful model of real-world communication, and it is still
not completely clear what “being committed” means or should mean exactly.
A usual way to put commitment-based semantics into practice is thus to pre-
scribe a semantics of communication which deliberatively limits itself to the
expression of the meaning of communication in terms of (themselves rather
under-speciﬁed) commitments.
On the contrary, the expressiveness of mentalistic semantics is very high
(when applicable), modeling entire agents situated in interaction. Our work
aims at lifting most of this expressiveness to the social level by modeling the
rational public identities of the agents (called social agents in [16]) in terms
of their ostensible beliefs and intentions. In addition to that, mentalistic
approaches have the appeal of being widely used and rather intuitive. In
section 3.2, we will see how a subset of FIPA’s communication acts semantics
(which is mentalistic) can be “lifted” to the level of ostensible beliefs and
opinions. This is not to provide a full-ﬂedged alternative ACL semantics, but
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to hint how a semantics grounded in communication attitudes could look like.
To establish communication attitudes, we take the viewpoint of an ob-
server which selectively overhears communication processes and models and
revises from these observations a current “communication attitudes store” of
the communication system. This observer can either be passive, or be one of
the agents participating in the observed interaction. We associate opinions
with social contexts (or “contexts” for short) which partially or fully describe
the communicative state in which the respective attitude is maintained and
provide expected (i.e., possibly uncertain) conditions for the initiation and
termination of the respective attitude (its logical validity, respectively). In
this paper, we model the social conditions of attitudes both logically and pro-
cedurally (using Dynamic Logic) as sequences of observable actions and other
events, plus the uttering and addressed agents (or agent groups). Alternative
approaches to context modeling are imaginable and have been proposed in
speech act theory, but are not investigated in this paper for lack of space.
The validity of communication attitudes of course not only depends on
their contexts, but also on the observed agent’s mental states. However, an
observer in an open system has to rely on publicly visible events to determine
relevant conditions and consequences. According to sociological approaches
to communication like social systems theory [14], the knowledge of commu-
nication processes alone is, in general, suﬃcient to derive reliable (but not
necessarily fully certain) communication structures from an observers’ point
of view, since communication (such as that of opinions) relies heavily on previ-
ous and expected future communication to be understood and eﬀective [14,15].
More precisely, social conditions obtained in terms of observed and an-
ticipated communication acts, other kind of observable events, and logical
conditions trigger and end communication attitudes. These can in turn con-
tribute to the social conditions for other communication attitudes (cf. section
3.2 for a basic approach to such trigger events). They also determine the dy-
namic, possibly uncertain, and revisable expectation about how long a newly
triggered attitude is likely to be maintained, and what concrete actions will
expectedly accompany the sustainment of this attitude (the run-time eﬀects
of holding the respective attitude, and thus its meaning in a consequentialist,
pragmatic sense). Behavioral expectations [16] provide a general semantics of
communication attitudes and, indirectly, one of communication acts which can
be given a semantics in terms of communication attitudes. Strictly speaking,
logical conditions that constrain communication attitudes (like “Agent holds
opinion a→¬ Agent holds opinion ¬a”) can also be provided as fallible expec-
tations only, since agents are fully autonomous to violate every communication
model. We will nevertheless provide a number of such conditions as axioms,
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justiﬁed by the fact that communication attitudes need to be reliable, inher-
ently logically and intentionally consistent (at least to some minimal degree)
to be usable for reasonable interaction.
An opinion held by an agent in a certain state of interaction can thus
informally be written as a tuple Op(Provenance,Target,Proposition) holding
given Precondition, where Provenance is an unambiguous information source
identiﬁer (ostensible intentions can be treated analogously). Technically,
the provenance could be represented as a URI, e.g. denoting an artiﬁcial
or human agent, a group of agents, a web site, or a peer node within a
Peer-to-Peer system. If anonymous contributions are desired, nicknames
could be used, although this might reduce the reliability of knowledge
rating techniques (cf. section 4), as known from the spamming of Google.
Target denotes the addressee(s) of the opinion. For example, an agent
might maintain two inconsistent ostensible opinions at the same time, facing
two diﬀerent other agents in two parallel discourses, whereby our observer
overhears both. Proposition is a logical statement, the actual content of the
opinion, Precondition denotes, as a social context, a course of action which is
a precondition for holding this opinion (from the viewpoint of the observer,
which may be wrong) 8 .
To sum up, ostensible beliefs and intentions
• are triggered, constrained and ended to a signiﬁcant amount by social con-
ditions like communication acts and their contexts, norms, organizational
structures, etc.;
• provide a second set of attitudes as a veriﬁable, social-level replacement for
mental attitudes;
• are restricted by logical conditions like opinion consistency given certain
social contexts;
• provide a means for modeling the public (or discourse) identities of men-
tally opaque agents. With context-dependant communication attitudes, a
single agent can exhibit multiple, possibly inconsistent external identities
subsequently or even at the same time (e.g., facing diﬀerent conversational
partners);
• can (but not must) be semantically grounded in expectations regarding the
respective agent’s future behavior; and
• can be optionally reﬁned using additional information like the reputation of
8 This could also be a possible (but not necessary) course of events in the future, but this
aspect is not covered in this paper.
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an opinion holder or the reliability of the respective opinion.
3 A Dynamic Logic with Modalities for Opinions and
Ostensible Intentions
In the following, we suggest Propositional Dynamic Communication Attitude
Logic (pDCAL) as an extension of Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL) [9]
with additional modalities for opinions and ostensible intentions. The intu-
itive meaning of these modalities has already been described. Our main goal
here is to “lift” the usual modal logic and protocol languages for modeling
agent beliefs and intentions and their revision (see, e.g., [10]) to the communi-
cation level, in order to deal with opaque agents in open systems. Within the
scope of this work, we have chosen Dynamic Logic as a basis for this, but other
formalisms (like the event calculus [13]) could certainly be used instead. As
we have seen in the previous section, their dependency on social conditions is
a crucial property of communication attitudes, demarcating them, inter alia,
from mental attitudes (which also have contexts, of course, but of a diﬀerent
kind). Since an exhaustive description of all the possible ways by which com-
munication attitudes are steered by social conditions of various kinds is far
beyond the scope of this paper, we conﬁne ourselves to the presentation of sim-
ple trigger events (communication acts modeled using FIPA communication
acts), which is after all in line with the FIPA semantics.
3.1 Syntax
Deﬁnition 3.1 The syntax of well-formed pDCAL formulas F, F1, F2, . . . and
processes α, β, . . . is given by
F, F1, F2, . . . ::= p |  | ⊥ | ¬F1 | F1 ∧ F2 | F1 ∨ F2 | F1 → F2 | F1 ↔ F2 | 〈α〉p |
done(α) | Op(a1, a2, F ) | OInt(a1, a2, F ) | Bel(a, F ) | Int(a, F )
α, β, . . . ::= action | ai.action | any | α; β | α ∪ β | α ∗ | F ?
Here,
• a, ai ∈ Sources are opinion sources, i.e., an agent, an agent group (denoted
as a set of agents), or a (group of) non-agent opinion resources like peers in
a Peer2Peer network or web documents;
• p is a proposition;
• action, ai.action ∈ A, with A denoting the set of elementary actions; ev-
ery elementary action can be indexed with an agent (e.g., agent
3
.assert
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represents the communication act “assert” uttered by agent
3
);
• any is an arbitrary action;
• α; β denotes sequential process combination (i.e., (sub-)process α is followed
by β);
• α ∪ β denotes non-deterministic choice between α and β;
• α∗ denotes zero or more iterations of α;
• F ? is a test operation (i.e., the process proceeds if F holds true);
• 〈α〉p denotes that α can be processed, and p holds afterwards;
• Op(a1, a2, F ) denotes that agent a1 holds the opinion (ostensible belief) F
facing agent a2
9 ;
• OInt(a1, a2, F ) hold iﬀ agent a1 facing agent a2 exhibits the intention to
make F come true (i.e., a1 holds the ostensible intention that he will per-
form/make true F by himself);
• Bel(a, F ) denotes that agent a (sincerely) believes that F ; and
• Int(a, F ) denotes that agent a (sincerely) intends that F .
¬,∧,,⊥,→ and↔ shall have the usual meaning. See below for the mean-
ing of done (adopted from FIPA-SL semantics [5]). Further, let Sources = {ai}
the set of all provenance identiﬁers, Θ = {α, β, γ...} the set of all syntacti-
cally valid processes, and Φ = {F, F1, F2, ...} the set of all syntactically valid
pDCAL formulas.
For convenience, we also deﬁne holder(Op(a1, a2, F )) = a1,
addressee(Op(a1, a2, F )) = a2 and content(Op(a1, a2, F )) = F .
3.2 Axioms and Properties
We do not aim at a complete axiomatization of our logic here. Instead, we
deﬁne basic axioms, based on KD45 and the usual other axioms for Belief-
Intention modalities. We also propose some further properties, not all being
deducible from the axioms or worth making them axioms themselves (among
other reasons, because the FIPA-like communication acts we use lack a suit-
able, consented semantics), but nevertheless reasonable in our opinion. Ax-
ioms for mental beliefs and mental intentions could be trivially added to our
language and have been omitted here for lack of space.
9 This opinion can of course be dropped in other contexts. Also see section 3.2 for a
diﬀerentiation between passive and active opinions.
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Axioms
(1) (Kop) Op(a1, a2, F1 → F2) → (Op(a1, a2, F1) → Op(a1, a2, F2))
(2) (DOp) Op(a1, a2, F ) → ¬Op(a1, a2,¬F )
(3) (4Op) Op(a1, a2, F ) → Op(a1, a2,Op(a1, a2, F )) ∧
Op(a2, a1,Op(a1, a2, F )))
(4) (5Op) ¬Op(a1, a2, F ) → Op(a1, a2,¬Op(a1, a2, F ))
(5) OInt(a1, a2, F1 → F2) → (OInt(a1, a2, F1) → OInt(a1, a2, F2))
(6) OInt(a1, a2, F ) → ¬OInt(a1, a2,¬F )
(7) Op(a1, a2, OInt(a1, a2, F )) ↔ OInt(a1, a2, F )
(8) Op(a1, a2,¬OInt(a1, a2, F )) ↔ ¬OInt(a1, a2, F )
(9) OInt(a1, a2, F ) → ¬Op(a1, a2, F ) (or Op(a1, a2, F ) → ¬OInt(a1, a2, F ))
(10) OInt(a1, a2,Op(a2, a1, F )) → Op(a1, a2, F )
(11) Op(a1, a2, F ) → 〈a2.Query(a1, F ); a1.Reply(a2, F )〉
Axioms 1 to 4 correspond to the usual axioms K, D, 4 and 5 of a modal
logic of belief. Axiom 4Op also reﬂects that opinions are directed from a
sender to an addressee, and are visible for this addressee.
The remaining axioms concern additional properties of opinions, osten-
sible intentions and the relationship between them. Axiom 11 states that
agents (have to) admit their opinions at least upon request. This denotes pas-
sive opinions, whereas pro-active opinions (denoted as Opactive) correspond
to the ostensible intention to spread the opinions pro-actively among their
respective addressees. For pro-active opinions, OInt(a1, a2,Op(a2, a1, F )) ↔
Opactive(a1, a2, F ) holds (cp. axiom 10), i.e., pro-active opinions can be mod-
eled in terms of ostensible intentions.
We further propose the following set of axioms to bridge the gap between
ostensible beliefs and ostensible intentions on the one hand and mental atti-
tudes on the other. We think, however, that in most cases these will not be
needed to reason about communication processes.
(12) OInt(a1, a2, F ) ↔ Bel(a2, OInt(a1, a2, F ))
(13) OInt(a1, a2, F ) ↔ Bel(a1, OInt(a1, a2, F ))
(14) Op(a1, a2, F ) ← Bel(a2,Op(a1, a2, F )) (i.e. opinions are not necessarily
visible, but if an agent comes to believe that someone holds an opinion
this belief is justiﬁed)
(15) Op(a1, a2, F ) ↔ Bel(a1,Op(a1, a2, F ))
(16) Op(a1, a2, Bel(a1, x) ↔ y) ↔ Op(a1, a2, y)
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Properties
The following property expresses that holding an ostensible intention regard-
ing a sequence of actions means that the agent truly intents a preﬁx of this
sequence. As a heuristic, at least those actions are truly intended that need
to be performed under mutual observation of the communicating agents (e.g.,
h ≥ 1 in the following instead of h ≥ 0 if the next announced action is under
observation).
OInt(a1, a2, done(〈action1; action2; ...; actionn〉))
→ ∃h ≥ 0 : Int(a1, done(〈action1; ...; actionh〉))
Here, done(action) denotes that action has been executed successfully.
If the mental state of a1 is not accessible, the value of the sphere h
could be determined context-depended via empirical observation of past
ostensible intentions and their consequences in terms of actions executed by
a1. A similar sphere can analogously be deﬁned for pro-active opinions, i.e.,
OInt(a1, a2,Op(a2, a1, F1)), and would require us to determine the course
of actions performed by a1 allegedly towards getting this opinion accepted.
Since the same agent might be trustable in one context and cheat in another,
these spheres allow for a much more accurate analysis than the assignment of
reliability and trustability to “whole agents”. But even the the relationship
of intentions and ostensible intentions suggested above might be still not
ﬁne-grained enough, since it does not determine how (in a qualitative sense)
ostensible intentions are put into action in a concrete situation.
The above mapping of ostensible to mental intentions would already provide
a very simple semantics for ostensible intentions and beliefs, but it would
come at the price that it would anchor communication attitudes in mental
attitudes. Another problem would be that no concrete method for the deter-
mination of the sphere h is given. For these reasons, we prefer a semantics
of Oint and Op based on expectations [16], i.e., to provide the meaning of
communication attitudes in terms of the expected behavioral consequences of
holding the respective attitude, represented as a probability distribution of
observable events. One way to achieve this practically at run-time is basically
to obtain the sequences of the communications which had brought about the
communication attitudes (cf. below in regard to FIPA-style communication
acts), and then to use the empirical semantics algorithm [15] to calculate
extrapolations (i.e., predicted continuations) of these sequence. In addition to
such empirical expectations, normative and adaptive-normative expectations
[16] can be used to describe how an agent which demonstrates a certain
communication attitude should behave. Alternatively, an adoption of the
usual Kripke-style semantics for beliefs and intentions [8,10] is also imaginable.
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The following properties denote relationships between communication at-
titudes and selected communicative acts in terms of pre- and post-conditions
(FP, RE). While these acts shall not denote FIPA communication acts, they
deliberatively resemble FIPA-ACL syntax and are give in FIPA style using
(non-exhaustive) pre- and post-conditions (denoted FP and RE, respectively)
[5]. This is not to provide an alternative semantics, but to give some intuitive
basics on how such a semantics in terms of communicative attitudes could
look like. Trust and sincerity axioms are not required.
• a1.inform(a2, F ) (agent a1 informs agent a2 that F )
FP: ¬Op(a2, a1, F ) ∧ ¬Op
active(a1, a2, F )
RE: Op(a1, a2, F ) ∧ OInt(a1, a2,Op(a2, a1, F ))
In RE, Op(a1, a2, F ) is redundant (cf. axiom 10), but stated for clarity.
In absence of trustability or expectations, the use of communication instead
of mental attitudes would thus make the FIPA-inform essentially a request
do adopt an opinion (a “requesting assertion”, respectively) with a largely
uncertain eﬀect on the addressee (in case no previous knowledge about the
agents’ truthfulness etc. is given).
• a1.request(a2, α) (agent a1 requests that agent a2 performs α)
FP: ¬OInt(a1, a2, done(a2.α))
RE: OInt(a1, a2, done(a2.α))
Again, the postcondition is a statement about how a1 is situated after the
request, while the corresponding post-conditions of the FIPA semantics
describe the eﬀect on the addressee (which is simply Bel(a2, OInt(...)) ∧
Op(a2, a1, OInt(...)), according to the axioms).
In order to provide a means for the agreement or disagreement with as-
serted knowledge, the following additional communicative acts will be useful:
• a1.approve(a2, F ) (agent a1 informs agent a2 that she agrees F , F asserted
previously by agent a2)
FP: OInt(a2, a1,Op(a1, a2, F )) (which implies Op(a2, a1, F ) according to
axiom 10)
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RE: Op(a1, a2, F )
• a1.disapprove(a2, F )
FP: OInt(a2, a1,Op(a1, a2, F ))
RE: Op(a1, a2,¬F )
As already mentioned before, we have two diﬀerent kinds of opinions now:
pro-active opinions, which have been pro-actively expressed in terms of an
assertion, and passive opinions, which might have only been uttered as a
reply or (dis-)agreement (the former occurs if approve is used to answer a
question). We can write OInt(a1, a2,Op(a2, a1, F )) to explicitly express pro-
active opinions (Opactive). Of course, and in accordance with axiom 10, these
are (passive) opinions as well.
If a passive opinion is expected without having asked the opinion holder, we
talk about a latent opinion. In some cases, e.g., when a communication process
is not fully observable, or is expected to occur in the future, reasoning about
the probabilities associated with passive opinions might become necessary, but
otherwise, it can be safely assumed that latent opinions are uttered (veriﬁable)
at least on request (like in an opinion poll).
As it can be seen, the semantics of communicative acts in terms of opin-
ions and ostensible intentions is rather lightweight. Thus, to provide a rich
semantics for communicative acts, the observable process the acts are embed-
ded in has to be evaluated, in order to compensate for the lack of information
about agents’ mental states that is inherent in open systems. In particular,
such an approach would have to provide a means for i) tracking opinions, ii)
recognizing and predicting opinion changes caused by a change of context,
iii) identifying the particular actions an agents carries out to get her opinions
accepted, and iv) reacting appropriately to other agents’ opinions.
4 Acquiring and fusing heterogeneous opinions
As an example application of pDCAL and the communication act semantics
proposed in 3.2, we now present an approach to knowledge bases and ontolo-
gies for knowledge acquired from multiple, heterogeneous sources (a group of
agents, for example), with the special features that i) (ﬁrst order) statements
are weighted probabilistically regarding their degrees of ostensible commu-
nicative (i.e., social) acceptance, that ii) a knowledge base or ontology might
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contain mutually inconsistent statements (whereas the knowledge base itself
is not inconsistent, since the statements are reiﬁed by opinion modalities), iii)
every statement is extended with its provenance (i.e., the asserting agent, or
another source of opinion, like communities, organizations or data bases), and
iv) the bases can be socially contextualized using (fragments of) discourses.
Deﬁnition 4.1 An opinion base is a tuple OpBase(ρ, φ, ﬁlter ,weight , rows),
where
• ρ ∈ Θ is a (possibly non-deterministic, i.e., concurrent) communication
process;
• φ ∈ 2Φ is a set of pDCAL formulas such that for all elements F of φ, F has
the form 〈filter(ρ)〉F ′;
• ﬁlter : Θ → Θ is a function which maps a process to another process
such that a set of zero or more elementary actions in the origin process are
replaced by ? (e.g., all actions of a particular agent whose opinions should
be omitted from the knowledge base), in order to tailor the opinion base to
a set of interesting or relevant contributions, topics or provenances;
• weight : Φ → [0; 1] is an assessment function for the rating of knowledge
contributions; and
• rows : {((supporterss, opponentss), s, ws)|supporterss, opponentss ∈
2Sources,
s ∈ Φ, ws ∈ [0; 1]} is the “output” of the opinion base with
supporterss = {a|∃o ∈ O : (content(o) |= s) ∧ holder(o) = a},
opponentss = {a|∃o ∈ O : (content(o) |= ¬s) ∧ holder(o) = a},
ws = weight(s), and
O = {Op(a1, a2, F )|∃F ∈ φ : φ |= Op(a1, a2, F )}.
As one among several particular weight functions that appear reasonable,
we propose the following valuation which assigns assertions the degree of os-





with supporterss and opponentss deﬁned as above. A diﬀerent deﬁnition of
weight can be found below.
If the opinion base viewer is mainly interested in the reliability of par-
ticular opinions instead of the unbiased distribution of social support, she
could multiply every weight(s) with a factor corresponding to the reliabil-
ity of either one of the opinion holders of s (e.g., weight(s) = weightA(s) ·
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max({reputation(ai)|ai ∈ supporterss}), or with a reliability factor for every
statement, obtained, e.g., from background knowledge, via user feedback or
voting.
We expect that diﬀerent users of opinion bases would create diﬀerent deﬁ-
nitions for ﬁlter and weight in order to tailor the opinion base to their personal
viewpoints and needs.
Note that unlike in ”pure” Bayesian belief aggregation systems (e.g. [18]),
the weights here express the probability that one member chosen by chance out
of the group of supporters and opponents of the respective statement supports
the statement communicatively in a concrete social situation. Opinion bases
are therefore closer related to behavioral reasoning.
Example 4.2 Consider the following set of sales talks, advertisements and
consumer chats, observed until a certain time point, and denoted as a linear
program:
a1.inform({a2, ..., a7}, fast(digicam));
a2.inform({a3, ..., a7},¬fast(digicam));
a3.inform({a1, a2, a4, ..., a7},¬fast(digicam));
a4.inform({a1, a2},¬fast(digicam) ∧ heavy(digicam));
a5.inform({a1, ..., a7}, fast(digicam));
a1.inform({a1, ..., a7}, costs(digicam, 120£));
a2.inform({a3, ..., a7}, costs(digicam, 138£));
a1.approve(a2, costs(digicam, 138£));
a6.request(a1, handy − camera);
a1.inform(a6,¬heavy(digicam));
a7.request(a1, solid − camera);
a1.inform(a7, heavy(digicam))
Table 1 shows the resulting opinion base contextualized by the communication
sub-processes above, given weight := weightA and filter := id. For propo-
sitions, we use a FOL syntax. It can be seen that a1 takes two inconsistent
opinions, depending on if he faces a6 or a7. In contrast, he corrects (“over-
writes”) himself when confronted with the information by a2 about the price
of the camera.
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Supporters vs. Opponents Assertion Social approval
{a1, a5}vs.{a2, a3, a4} fast(digicam) 0.4
{a2, a3, a4}vs.{a1, a5} ¬fast(digicam) 0.6
{a4}vs.{a1, a5} ¬fast(digicam) ∧ heavy(digicam) 0.33
{a1}vs.{a4, a1} ¬heavy(digicam) 0.33
{a1, a4}vs.{a1} heavy(digicam) 0.66
{}vs.{a1, a2} costs(digicam, 120£) 0
{a1, a2}vs.{} costs(digicam, 138£) 1
Table 1
Opinion base contextualized by the communication sub-processes of example 4.2
Supporters Assertion Ranking
{a2, a3, a4} ¬fast(digicam) 0.6
{a1, a5} fast(digicam) 0.4
{a1, a4} heavy(digicam) 0.4
{a1, a2} costs(digicam, 138£) 0.4
{a4} ¬fast(digicam) ∧ heavy(digicam) 0.2
{a1} ¬heavy(digicam) 0.2
{} costs(digicam, 120£) 0
Table 2
Opinion base contextualized by the communication sub-processes of example 4.2, but with the
alternative weight function of example 4.3 and Opponents omitted.
with all being the set of all opinion holders (not only of opinion s), which is
{a1, a2, ..., a5} in our example. As shown in table 2, this results in a Google-like
opinion ranking when ordered by weight.
5 Conclusion
Finding appropriate computational approaches to the challenges posed by
open environments (like truly autonomous artiﬁcial and human agents, and
the emergence of meaning and knowledge from interaction) is deﬁnitely a great
challenge and requires long-term research eﬀorts. We hope that the approach
outlined in this work will be a fruitful contribution. On the one hand, agent
behavior and knowledge from autonomous sources need to provide a stable
grounding for interaction and applications. On the other hand, agents in
open environments are self-interested grey or black boxes which cannot and
should not be fully controlled as a matter of fact. Opinions in open scenar-
ios can be unreliable, inconsistent information emerging from a potentially
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large number of competing goals and viewpoints, and a priori there might be
no such thing as a commonly agreed “truth” or common interests. To move
towards a solution for these problems must be a core concern of a strictly
communication-oriented paradigm of agent systems engineering and of appli-
cation ﬁelds like agent-mediated knowledge management, and has been the
basic motivation underlying the work described here. Future works in this
regard could include the further exploitation of communication attitude se-
mantics, the practical evaluation in the context of real-world applications, and
the potential integration with the related grounding-based approach to dis-
course modeling [11].
With this work, we explicitly do not want to provide mechanisms to judge
which opinions are worth keeping, or which of them are “reliable”, “valu-
able” or even “true”, as it is sometimes done in the context of collaborative
belief integration and revision frameworks (see, e.g., [18,4]), and approaches
to trustability and reputation (see, e.g., [7,1]). While we think that these
approaches are extremely useful, the primary goal of our current and future
work in the area of agent opinions is to map divergent opinion systems to their
social semantics, like their provenances, the social communities and condition-
ing processes of their utterance, the amount and kind of support they receive
from others, their emergence from and dissemination via communication, and
the consensus or dissent they give rise to.
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